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Abstract
In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of
geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they
jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts
one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the “optimal ger-
rymandering rule”). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy
our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.
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1 Introduction
The districting problem has received considerable attention recently, both from the
political science and the economics viewpoint.1 Much of the recent work has focused
on strategic aspects and the incentives induced by different institutional designs on
the political parties, legislators and voters (see, among others, Besley and Preston,
2007, Friedman and Holden, 2008, Gul and Pesendorfer, 2010). Other contributions
have looked at the welfare implications of different redistricting policies (e.g. Coate and
Knight, 2007). Finally, there is also a sizable literature on the computational aspects of
the districting problem (see, e.g. Puppe and Tasna´di, 2008, and the references therein,
and Ricca, Scozzari and Simeone, 2011, for a general overview of the operations research
literature on the districting problem).
∗We are most grateful to an editor and two anonymous referees for their thorough remarks and
suggestions which helped to improve the first version of this paper.
†D – 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany, clemens.puppe@kit.edu
‡H – 1093 Budapest, Fo˝va´m te´r 8, Hungary, attila.tasnadi@uni-corvinus.hu
1See, e.g., Tasna´di (2011) for an overview.
1
In contrast to these contributions, the present paper takes a normative point of
view. We formulate desirable properties (“axioms”), and investigate which district-
ing rules satisfy them. The axiomatic method allows one to endow the vast space of
conceivable districting rules with useful additional structure: each combination of de-
sirable properties characterizes a specific class of districting rules, and thereby helps
one to assess their respective merits. Furthermore, one may hope that specific combi-
nations of axioms single out a few, perhaps sometimes even a unique districting rule,
thus reducing the space of possibilities. Finally, the axiomatic approach may reveal
incompatibility of certain axioms by showing that no districting rule can satisfy certain
combinations of desirable properties, thereby terminating a futile search.
In a framework with two parties and geographical constraints on the shape of dis-
tricts, we propose a set of five simple axioms which are motivated by considerations
of fairness to voters. The first three axioms restrict the informational basis needed for
the construction of a districting. Essentially, they jointly amount to the requirement
that the only information that may enter a fair districting rule is the number of dis-
tricts won by the parties. The motivation for such a requirement is that, ultimately,
voters care only about outcomes, i.e. the implemented policies, but these outcomes
only depend on the distribution of seats in the parliament – through some political
decision process that is not explicitly modeled here. Thus, for instance, if two different
districtings induce the same seat shares in the parliament, then either none or both
should be considered fair since they are indistinguishable in terms of final outcomes.
Restricting the informational basis for the assessment of districting rules to the pos-
sible seat distributions they imply is also attractive from the viewpoint of managing
the complexity of the districting problem, since evidently it greatly simplifies the is-
sue. Our approach is thus “consequentialist” in the sense that the relative merits of
a districting are measured only by the possible outcomes it produces. The destricting
process as such does not matter. We emphasize that the geographical constraints nev-
ertheless play an important role: they enter indirectly in the assessment of districtings
since they influence the possible numbers of districts each party can win. For instance,
a bias in the seat share in favor of one party may be acceptable if it is forced by the
given geographical constraints, but not if it is avoidable by an alternative admissible
districting.
Our fourth condition, the “consistency axiom,” requires that an admissible dis-
tricting should induce admissible sub-districtings on any appropriate subregion. This
axiom reflects the normative principle that a “fair” institution must be fair in every
part (cf. Balinski and Young’s uniformity principle, 2001), or more concretely in our
context: a representation of voters via a districting is globally fair only if it is also
locally fair. The consistency condition greatly simplifies the internal structure of the
admissible districtings, too. The fifth and final condition requires anonymity, i.e. that
the districting should be invariant with respect to a re-labeling of parties. In our
context, such anonymity requirement has a straightforward normative interpretation
in terms of fairness since it amounts to an equal treatment of parties (and voters)
ex-ante.
An important conceptual ingredient (and mathematical challenge) of our analysis
is the presence of geographical constraints. We model this via an exogenously given
collection of admissible districts from which a districting selects a subset that forms a
partition of the entire region. We impose one restriction on the collection of admissible
districts other than the standard requirement of equal population mass: that it be
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possible to move from one admissible districting to any other admissible districting via
a sequence of intermediate districtings changing only two districts at each step.2 This
“linkedness” condition is satisfied by a large class of geographies. Except for a technical
“no-ties” assumption, no other restriction is imposed on the collection of admissible
districts, thus our approach is very general in this respect. In particular, the absence of
geographical constraints can be modeled by taking all subregions of equal population
mass as the collection of admissible districts (which gives rise to a linked geography).
Moreover, restrictions that are frequently imposed on the shape of districts in practice,
such as compactness or contiguity, can in principle be incorporated in our approach
by an appropriate choice of admissible districts; for an explicit analysis of these and
related issues, see e.g. Chambers and Miller (2010, 2013) and the references given there.
We prove that on all linked geographies, the first four of our axioms jointly charac-
terize the districting rule which maximizes the number of districts that one party can
win, given the distribution of individual votes (the “optimal gerrymandering rule”).
Evidently, by generating a maximal number of winning districts for one of the two
parties, the optimal gerrymandering rule violates the anonymity condition. As a corol-
lary, we therefore obtain that no districting rule can satisfy all five axioms. The result
also suggests that any reasonable districting rule must necessarily be complex: either
it has a complex internal structure by violating the consistency principle, or it has to
employ a complex informational basis in the sense that it depends on more than the
mere number of districts won by each party.
The work closest to ours in the literature is Chambers (2008, 2009) who also takes
an axiomatic approach. However, one of his central conditions is the requirement that
the election outcome be independent of the way districts are formed (“gerrymandering-
proofness”), and the main purpose of his analysis is to explore the consequences of this
requirement (for a similar approach, see Bervoets and Merlin, 2011). By contrast, our
focus is precisely on the issue how the districting influences the election outcome, and
the aim of our analysis is to structure the vast space of possibilities by means of simple
principles. In particular, geographical constraints which are absent in Chambers’ model
play an important role in our analysis.
The paper by Landau, Reid and Yershov (2009) also addresses the issue of “fair”
districting. However, unlike our work their paper is concerned with the question of how
to implement a fair solution to the districting problem by letting the parties themselves
determine the boundaries of districts. Specifically, these authors propose a protocol
similar in spirit to the well-known divide-and-choose procedure.
The districting rules that we consider depend among other things on the distribution
of votes for each party in the population. One might argue, perhaps on grounds of
some “absolute” notion of ex ante fairness, that a districting rule must not depend on
voters’ party preferences since these can change over time. From this perspective, the
districting problem is not really an issue and it would seem that any districting which
partitions the population in (roughly) equally sized subgroups should be acceptable. By
contrast, in the present paper we are interested in a “relative” or ex post notion of fair
districting, i.e. in the question of what would constitute an acceptable districting rule
given the distribution of the supporters of each party in the population. This question
seems particularly important for practical purposes since a districting policy can be
successfully implemented only if it receives sufficient support by the actual legislative
2Since a districting forms a partition of the given region, it is evidently not possible to move from
one districting to another districting by changing only one district.
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body.
2 The Framework
We assume that parties A and B compete in an electoral system consisting only of
single member districts, where the representatives of each district are determined by
plurality. The parties as well as the independent bodies face the following districting
problem.
Definition 1 (Districting problem). A districting problem is given by the structure
Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G), where
• the voters are located within a subset X of the plane R2,
• A is the σ-algebra on X consisting of all districts that can be formed without
geographical or any other type of constraints,
• the distribution of voters is given by a measure µ on (X,A),
• the distributions of party A and party B supporters are given by measures µA
and µB on (X,A) such that µ = µA + µB ,
• t is the given number of seats in parliament,
• G ⊆ A, also called geography, is a collection of admissible districts satisfying
µ(g) = µ(X)/t and
µA(g) 6= µB(g) (1)
for all g ∈ G, and admitting a partitioning of X, i.e there exist mutually disjoint
sets g′1, . . . , g
′
t ∈ G such that ∪ti=1g′i = X.
Condition (1) excludes ties in the distribution of party supporters in all admissible
districts to avoid the necessity of introducing tie-breaking rules. This condition is
satisfied, for instance, if the set of voters is finite, µ, µA, µB are the counting measures
and the district sizes are odd.
Definition 2 (Districting). A districting for problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) is a
subset D ⊆ G such that D forms a partition of X and #D = t.
We shall denote by δA(D) and δB(D) the number of districts won by party A and
party B under D, respectively. We write DΠ for the set of all districtings of problem
Π and let δA(D) = {δA(D) : D ∈ D} and δB(D) = {δB(D) : D ∈ D} for any D ⊆ DΠ.
Definition 3 (Solution). A solution F associates to each districting problem Π a
non-empty set of chosen districtings FΠ ⊆ DΠ.
3 Several Solutions
We now present a number of simple solution candidates. The first solution determines
the optimal partisan gerrymandering from the viewpoint of party A.
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Definition 4 (Optimal solution for A). The optimal solution OA for party A deter-
mines for districting problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) the set of those districtings
that maximize the number of winning districts for party A, i.e.
OAΠ = arg max
D∈DΠ
δA(D).
Evidently, in the absence of other objectives, OA is the solution favored by party
A supporters. The optimal solution OB for party B is defined analogously. If we are
referring to an optimal solution O, then we have either OA or OB in mind.
The next solution minimizes the difference in the number of districts won by the
two parties. It has an obvious egalitarian spirit.
Definition 5 (Most equal solution). The solution ME determines for districting prob-
lem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) the set of most equal districtings, i.e.
MEΠ = arg min
D∈DΠ
|δA(D)− δB(D)| . (2)
Clearly, depending on the distribution of votes in the population, an equal distri-
bution of seats in the parliament may not be possible. The most equal solution aims
to get as close as possible to equality in terms of the number of winning districts for
the two parties.
The third solution maximizes the difference in the number of districts won by the
two parties. The objective to maximize the winning margin of the ruling party could
be motivated, for instance, by the desire to avoid too much political compromise.
Definition 6 (Most unequal solution). The solution MU determines for districting
problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) the set of most unequal districtings, i.e.
MUΠ = arg max
D∈DΠ
|δA(D)− δB(D)| . (3)
Fourth, we consider the solution that minimizes partisan bias. It has a clear mo-
tivation from the point of view of maximizing representation of the “people’s will” in
the sense that the share of the districts won by each party is as close as possible to its
share of votes in the population.
Definition 7 (Least biased solution). The solution LB determines for districting prob-
lem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) the set of those districtings that minimize the absolute
difference between shares in winning districts and shares in votes, i.e.
LBΠ = arg min
D∈DΠ
∣∣∣∣δA(D)t − µA(X)µ(X)
∣∣∣∣ = arg minD∈DΠ
∣∣∣∣δB(D)t − µB(X)µ(X)
∣∣∣∣ . (4)
Finally, we mention the trivial solution that associates to each problem the set of
all admissible districtings.
Definition 8 (Complete solution). The complete solution C associates with any dis-
tricting problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) the set of all possible districtings DΠ.
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4 Axioms
In this section, we formulate five simple axioms and argue that each has appeal from
a normative (and sometimes also from a pragmatic) point of view.
The case of two districts plays a fundamental role in our analysis. Note that by
(1) it is not possible that a party can win both districts under one districting and
lose both districts under another districting, i.e. if t = 2 then δA(DΠ) (respectively,
δB(DΠ)) cannot contain both 0 and 2. Our first axiom requires that a solution must in
fact be “determinate” in the two-district case in the sense that it must not leave open
the issue whether there is a draw between the two parties or a victory for one party.
In other words, if a solution chooses a districting that results in a draw between the
parties for a given problem it cannot choose another districting for the same problem
that results in a victory for one party.
Axiom 1 (Two-district determinacy). A solution F satisfies two-district determinacy
if for any districting problem Π with t = 2, the sets δA(FΠ) and δB(FΠ) are singletons.
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The motivation for this axiom stems from our implicit assumption that voters do
not care about the districtings as such, but only about the entailed shares of seats in
the parliament, since it is the latter that influences final outcomes. Any indeterminacy
in the distribution of seats in the parliament potentially influences the outcome and
would thus introduce an element of arbitrariness of the final state of affairs. In the
two-district case, such indeterminacy necessarily turns a (unanimous) victory of one
party into a draw between the two parties, or vice versa. Two-district determinacy
prevents this to occur.
Evidently, all solutions considered in Section 2 with the exception of the complete
solution C satisfy Axiom 1. Also observe that on the family of all two-district problems
the most equal solution ME and the least biased solution LB coincide.4
Our next axiom requires that a solution behaves “uniformly” on the set of two-
district problems in the sense that the solution must treat different two-district prob-
lems in the same way, provided they admit the same set of possible distributions of the
number of districts won by each party.
Axiom 2 (Two-district uniformity). A solution F satisfies two-district uniformity if
for any districting problems Π and Π′ with t = 2 such that δA(DΠ) = δA(DΠ′) (and
therefore also δB(DΠ) = δB(DΠ′)) we have δA(FΠ) = δA(FΠ′) (and therefore also
δB(FΠ) = δB(FΠ′)).
Even though it is imposed only in the two-district case, Axiom 2 is admittedly a
strong requirement. It can be motivated by invoking again the assumption that vot-
ers care about districtings only via their influence on political outcomes. From this
perspective, Axioms 2 states that if the possible political outcomes are the same in
different two-district problems, then the actual outcome should also be the same. A
violation of Axiom 2 would mean that characteristics other than the possible distri-
butions of seat shares can influence the solution and hence the final outcome. But if
3Observe that overall determinacy, i.e. that δA(FΠ) and δB(FΠ) be singletons for every problem Π,
is a strictly stronger requirement than two-district determinacy; for instance, the least biased solution
satisfies two-district determinacy but can easily be shown to violate overall determinacy.
4To verify this, observe that if there exist admissible districtings D,D′ ∈ DΠ with δA(D) = 2 and
δA(D
′) = 1, then one must have 0.5 < µA(X)/µ(X) < 0.75. Thus, D′ must be chosen both by ME
and LB.
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these characteristics play no role in voters’ preferences, it is not clear how one could
justify such influence. To illustrate, consider two districting problems Π and Π′ with
δA(DΠ) = δA(DΠ′) = {1, 2}; thus, in either situation there exists one districting un-
der which party A wins both districts and another districting which produces a draw
between the two parties. Now assume that party A’s share of votes in situation Π is
in fact larger than its share of votes in situation Π′, i.e. µA > µ′A. Couldn’t this give
a good reason to select the districting under which A wins both seats in situation Π
but the districting in which both parties receive one seat in situation Π′, provided that
the difference between µA and µ
′
A is sufficiently large? But then, how large precisely
is “sufficiently large”? Is x% enough? And wouldn’t the threshold also have to de-
pend on the absolute level of µA? Two-district uniformity answers these question by a
very clearcut and simple recommendation: different treatment of different two-district
situations, for instance on the grounds that one party has a larger share of votes in
one of the situations, is justified only if the difference manifests itself in a difference
of the possible number of seats in parliament that the parties can win. Two-district
uniformity thus sets a high “threshold” for differential treatment of two-district situa-
tions. We emphasize therefore that all candidate solutions presented in Section 2 above
satisfy this condition; for the least biased solution this follows from Footnote 4, for the
other solutions it is evident.
A secondary motivation for Axiom 2 is to keep the complexity of a districting
solution manageable. Indeed, any influence of characteristics different from the possible
seat distribution in parliament – whether derived from the underlying distribution of
party supporters or from geographical information – would considerably complicate the
definition and implementation of a districting rule.
Our third axiom, imposed on districting problems of any size, has a motivation
related to that of the two previous axioms. It states that if a possible districting
induces the same distribution of the number of winning districts for each party than
some districting chosen by a solution, it must be chosen by this solution as well.
Axiom 3 (Indifference). A solution F satisfies indifference if for any districting prob-
lem Π we have that D ∈ FΠ, D′ ∈ DΠ, δA(D) = δA(D′) and δB(D) = δB(D′) implies
D′ ∈ FΠ.
The justification of the indifference axiom is straightforward under the intended
notion of fairness to voters. If voters care only about final outcomes, and if final
outcomes only depend on seat shares, then two districtings that entail the same seat
distribution in parliament are undistinguishable in terms of final outcomes and have
therefore to be treated equally. Evidently, all solutions presented above satisfy this
condition.
The following consistency axiom plays a central role in our analysis. It requires
that a solution to a problem should also deliver appropriate solutions to specific sub-
problems. Its spirit is very similar to the uniformity principle in Balinski and Young’s
(2001) theory of apportionment (“every part of a fair division should be fair”).
Prior to the definition of consistency we have to introduce specific subproblems of
a districting problem. For any problem Π, any D ∈ FΠ and any D′ ⊆ D, let Y =
∪d∈D′d and define the subproblem Π|Y to be (Y,A|Y , µ|Y , µA|Y , µB |Y ,#D′, G|Y ),
where A|Y = {A ∩ Y : A ∈ A}, G|Y = {g ∈ G : g ⊆ Y } and µ|Y , µA|Y , µB |Y stand for
the restrictions of measures µ, µA, µB to (Y,A|Y ).
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Axiom 4 (Consistency). A solution F satisfies consistency if for any districting prob-
lem Π, any D ∈ FΠ and any D′ ⊆ D we have for Y = ∪d∈D′d that
D′ ∈ FΠ|Y .
The motivation for imposing the consistency condition in our context is as follows.
Most federal countries have both federal and local legislatures, and in many of those
countries the same districts are used for both, local and federal elections. The con-
sistency axiom requires that a districting is a global solution, i.e. can be considered
“globally fair,” only if it also represents a solution on all appropriate subregions, i.e. is
also everywhere “locally fair.”5 In other words, consistency forbids to create a globally
fair treatment of voters by equilibrating different locally unfair treatments. Moreover,
it justifies using the same districts locally and globally – as is common practice in
most countries. Finally, consistency may also be of practical value if regions decide to
separate, or to increase political independence, since it would allow them to use the
same districting as before.
The optimal and complete solutions satisfy consistency. This is evident for the
complete solution. To verify it for the optimal solution suppose, by contradiction, that
there would exist D′ ⊂ D ∈ OAΠ such that D′ /∈ OAΠ|Y , where Y = ∪d∈D′d. This would
imply δA (D
′′ ∪ (D \D′)) > δA (D) for any D′′ ∈ OAΠ|Y , a contradiction.
By contrast, the other solutions considered in Section 2 violate consistency. This
can be verified by considering the districting problem Π with t = 3 shown in Fig. 1. It
consists of 27 voters of which 11 are supporters of party A (indicated by empty circles)
and 16 are supporters of party B (indicated by solid circles), and four admissible dis-
trictings D1 = {d1, d2, d3}, D2 = {d1, d4, d5}, D3 = {d3, d7, d8} and D4 = {d5, d7, d9}.
Note that party A wins two out of the three districts in D1 and D2, respectively, and
one of the three districts in D3 and D4, respectively. Consider the solution ME first.
Since the difference in the number of winning districts for the two parties is one in
all cases, we have MEΠ = {D1, D2, D3, D4}. Consider the districting D1 ∈ MEΠ and
Y = d1 ∪ d2. Consistency would require that the districting {d1, d2} is among the cho-
sen districtings if the solution is applied to the restricted problem on Y . But obviously,
we have MEΠ|Y = {{d7, d8}}, because the districting {d7, d8} induces a draw between
the winning districts on Y while the districting {d1, d2} entails two winning districts for
party A (and zero districts won by party B). Similarly, MU violates consistency with
D3 ∈MUΠ and Y = d7 ∪ d8 since MUΠ = {D1, D2, D3, D4} and MUΠ|Y = {{d1, d2}}.
v v f v f vf v f v
v v f f ff ff
v v v v v vv v f
d1
d2
d3
v v f v f vf v f v
v v f f ff ff
v v v v v vv v f
d1
d5
d4
v v f v f vf v f v
v v f f ff ff
v v v v v vv v f
d7 d8
d3
v v f v f vf v f v
v v f f ff ff
v v v v v vv v f
d7
d5
d9
Figure 1: ME, MU and LB violate consistency.
To verify, finally, that also LB violates consistency observe first that LBΠ = {D3, D4}
in Fig. 1. Consider D4 ∈ LBΠ and Y = d7 ∪ d9. Consistency would require that the
5Clearly, this requirement has to be restricted to subregions that are unions of districts, since a
given districting does not necessarily induce an admissible sub-districting on other subregions.
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districting {d7, d9} is among the districtings chosen by the solution on the restricted
problem on Y . But it is easily seen that LBΠ|Y = {{d1, d4}}, since the districting
{d1, d4} gives rise to a draw between the parties on Y which is closer to their re-
spective relative shares of votes on Y . Thus the least biased solution also violates
consistency.
Our final axiom expresses a very fundamental principle of fairness and equity in our
context, namely the symmetric treatment of parties ex ante.
Axiom 5 (Anonymity). A solution F satisfies anonymity if exchanging the distribu-
tions of party A and party B voters µA and µB does not change the set of chosen
districtings: for all districting problems Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G),
D ∈ F(X,A,µ,µA,µB ,t,G) if and only if D ∈ F(X,A,µ,µB ,µA,t,G).
Note that this can also be interpreted as a requirement of anonymity with respect
to voters across different parties; indeed, anonymity with respect to voters of the
same party is already implicit in our definition of a districting problem since only the
aggregate mass of parties’ supporters matters and not their identity. It is easily seen
that all solutions presented so far with exception of the optimal solution(s) satisfy the
anonymity axiom.
In the following we will show that for a large class of geographies no solution can
satisfy all five axioms simultaneously. While we consider the anonymity condition to
be an indispensable fairness requirement, our proof strategy is to show that the first
four axioms characterize the optimal partisan gerrymandering solution O. Since this
solution evidently violates anonymity the impossibility result follows.
5 A Characterization Result and an Impossibility
First, we consider districting problems with only two districts.
Lemma 1. F satisfies two-district determinacy, two-district uniformity and indiffer-
ence if and only if F = O, F = ME or F = MU for t = 2.
Proof. Observe that two-district determinacy and two-district uniformity jointly reduce
the set of possible districting rules for t = 2 to O, ME and MU if only the number
of winning districts matters (recall that ME = LB on all two-district problems). Now
indifference ensures that either all two-to-zero, all one-to-one, or all zero-to-two dis-
trictings admissible for problem Π have to be selected by solution F .
Finally, we have seen that O, ME and MU satisfy two-district determinacy, two-
district uniformity and indifference, which completes the proof.
Consider a districting problem for t = 3 with the 9 admissible districts and the 3
resulting districtings shown in Fig. 2, in which party A voters are indicated by empty
circles and party B voters by solid circles, µ equals the counting measure on (X,A) and
µA, µB are given by the respective number of party A and party B voters. It can be
verified that, considering the districtings from left to right, we obtain 3 to 0, 2 to 1 and
1 to 2 winning districtings for party A, respectively. Thus, e.g. the optimal solution for
party A would choose the first districting from the left, while the least biased solution
would choose the middle districting.
9
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Figure 2: Unlinked districtings.
The geography in the depicted problem is “thin” in the sense that all proper sub-
problems allow only one possible districting. Therefore, the consistency condition has
no bite at all in this problem. In order to make use of the consistency property, we will
restrict the family of admissible geographies in the following way.
Definition 9. The geography G of a problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) is linked
if for any two possible districtings D,D′ ∈ DΠ there exists a sequence D1, . . . , Dk of
districtings such that D = D1, {D2, . . . , Dk−1} ⊆ DΠ, D′ = Dk, and #Di∩Di+1 = t−2
for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
In the appendix, we present a large and natural class of linked geographies, which
arise from what we call regular districting problems. In a regular districting prob-
lem, µ is given by some finite measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure, and the admissible districts are the bounded Borel sets whose
boundary is a Jordan curve.
While the linkedness condition clearly limits the scope of our analysis, there is
no hope in obtaining characterization results of the sort derived here without further
assumptions on the family of geographies. Note also that under many specifications
of the measure µ the unrestricted geography which admits all subsets of size µ(X)/t
is linked (for instance, this holds if the set of voters is finite and µ is the counting
measure).
Proposition 1. If F equals OA for t = 2 and F is consistent and indifferent, then
F = OA for linked geographies.
Proof. Consider a districting problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) with t ≥ 3 and sup-
pose that FΠ 6= OAΠ but F is consistent and indifferent. Since FΠ is not OAΠ , there
exist D′ ∈ OAΠ and D ∈ FΠ such that δA(D′) > δA(D) by indifference. Since Π has a
linked geography there exists a sequence D1, . . . , Dk of districtings such that D
′ = D1,
{D2, . . . , Dk−1} ⊆ DΠ, D = Dk and #Di ∩Di+1 = t− 2 for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
We claim that
|δA(Di)− δA(Di+1)| ≤ 1 (5)
for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1, where Di and Di+1 just differ in two districts. To verify (5)
we shall denote the two pairs of different districts by d, d′, e and e′, where the first
two districts belong to Di while the latter two to Di+1. Observe that Di \ {d, d′} =
Di+1 \ {e, e′} by linkedness. Hence,
δA(Di)− δA(Di+1) = δA({d, d′}) + δA(Di \ {d, d′})− δA({e, e′})−
δA(Di+1 \ {e, e′})
= δA({d, d′})− δA({e, e′}). (6)
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By (1) we must have |δA({d, d′})− δA({e, e′})| ≤ 1, which implies, taking (6) into
consideration, (5).
Let j∗ ∈ {2, . . . , k} be the smallest index such that δA(Dj∗) = δA(Dk). Since Dk ∈
FΠ we haveDj∗ ∈ FΠ by indifference. Linkedness ensures thatDj∗−1 andDj∗ just differ
in two districts, which we shall denote by d, d′, e and e′, where the first two districts
belong to Dj∗−1 while the latter two to Dj∗ . Furthermore, Dj∗−1\{d, d′} = Dj∗\{e, e′}
by linkedness. Let Y = d ∪ d′ = e ∪ e′. Since F is consistent we have {e, e′} ∈ FΠ|Y .
Our assumption that F equals OA for t = 2 implies δA({d, d′}) ≤ δA({e, e′}). If j∗ = 2,
by consistency
δA(D1) > δA(Dk) = δA(D2) = δA({e, e′}) + δA(D2 \ {e, e′})
≥ δA({d, d′}) + δA(D1 \ {d, d′}) = δA(D1);
a contradiction. Otherwise, suppose that j∗ > 2. Then by consisteny and the optimal-
ity of F on Y we must have δA(Dj∗−1) ≤ δA(Dj∗). Moreover, δA(Dj∗−1) < δA(Dj∗)
by the definition of j∗. Then by (5) and
δA(D1) > δA(Dk) = δA(Dj∗) > δA(Dj∗−1)
there exists a j′ ∈ {2, . . . , j∗ − 1} such that δA(Dj′) = δA(Dk). Clearly, Dj′ ∈ FΠ by
indifference, contradicting the definition of j∗.6
Since neither the most equal or most unequal solutions satisfy consistency we cannot
extend ME or MU for t = 2 to arbitrary t in the manner of Proposition 1. However,
it might be the case that ME or MU for t = 2 can be extended to another consistent
solution. The next proposition demonstrates that such an extension does not exist.
Proposition 2. There does not exist a consistent and indifferent solution F that equals
ME or MU for t = 2 even for linked geographies.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a consistent and indifferent solution F that equals
ME for t = 2. Consider the districting problem Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , 3, G), where X
consists of 27 voters, A equals the set of all subsets of X, µ is the counting measure,
and G = {d1, . . . , d9} is as shown in Fig. 3 in which party A supporters are indicated
by empty circles and party B supporters by solid circles.
v f f v f vf f v
f v v f f v
v f f
v f v f v fv v v
d1 d2
d3
v f f v f vf f v
f v v f f v
v f f
v f v f v fv v v
d4
d2
d5
v f f v f vf f v
f v v f f v
v f f
v f v f v fv v v
d1 d7
d6
v f f v f vf f v
f v v f f v
v f f
v f v f v fv v v
d8 d9
d3
Figure 3: ME and MU cannot be extended.
We can see from Fig. 3 that the four possible districtings are D1 = {d1, d2, d3},
D2 = {d2, d4, d5}, D3 = {d1, d6, d7} and D4 = {d3, d8, d9}. It can be checked that the
given geography is linked. Since δA(D1) = 2 and δA(D2) = δA(D3) = δA(D4) = 1
6We would like to thank Dezso˝ Bednay for suggestions that improved our original proof.
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we must have either {D1} = FΠ, {D2, D3, D4} = FΠ or {D1, D2, D3, D4} = FΠ by
indifference. First, consider the cases of {D1} = FΠ and {D1, D2, D3, D4} = FΠ.
By consistency we must have {d1, d2} ∈ F(X′,A′,µ′,µ′A,µ′B ,2,G′), where X ′ = d1 ∪ d2,
G′ = {d1, d2, d8, d9} and A′, µ′, µ′A, µ′B denote the restrictions of A, µ, µA, µB to
X ′, respectively. However, F(X′,A′,µ′,µ′A,µ′B ,2,G′) should equal {d8, d9} since F = ME
for t = 2; a contradiction. Second, consider the case of {D2, D3, D4} = FΠ and pick
the case of D3. By consistency we must have {d6, d7} ∈ F(X′′,A′′,µ′′,µ′′A,µ′′B ,2,G′′), where
X ′′ = d6 ∪ d7, G′′ = {d2, d3, d6, d7} and A′′, µ′′, µ′′A, µ′′B denote the restrictions of A,
µ, µA, µB to X
′′, respectively. However, F(X′′,A′′,µ′′,µ′′A,µ′′B ,2,G′′) should equal {d2, d3}
since F = ME for t = 2; a contradiction.
Now suppose that there exists a consistent and indifferent solution F that equals
MU for t = 2. Consider once again the problem shown in Fig. 3. First, consider
the cases of {D1} = FΠ and {D1, D2, D3, D4} = FΠ. By consistency we must have
{d1, d3} ∈ F(X′,A′,µ′,µ′A,µ′B ,2,G′), where X ′ = d1 ∪ d3, G′ = {d1, d3, d4, d5} and A′,
µ′, µ′A, µ
′
B denote the restrictions of A, µ, µA, µB to X ′, respectively. However,
F(X′,A′,µ′,µ′A,µ′B ,2,G′) should equal {d4, d5} since F = MU for t = 2; a contradic-
tion. Second, consider the case of {D2, D3, D4} = FΠ and pick the case of D4. By
consistency we must have {d8, d9} ∈ F(X′′,A′′,µ′′,µ′′A,µ′′B ,2,G′′), where X ′′ = d8 ∪ d9,
G′′ = {d1, d2, d8, d9} and A′′, µ′′, µ′′A, µ′′B denote the restrictions of A, µ, µA, µB to
X ′′, respectively. However, F(X′′,A′′,µ′′,µ′′A,µ′′B ,2,G′′) should equal {d1, d2} since F = MU
for t = 2; a contradiction.
Our main theorem follows from Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2.
Theorem 1. The optimal solution O is the only solution that satisfies two-district de-
terminacy, two-district uniformity, indifference and consistency on linked geographies.
We verify, on linked geographies, the tightness of Theorem 1, i.e. the independence
of the axioms. First, the complete solution only violates two-district determinacy.
Second, ME, MU and LB just violate consistency.
Third, we investigate indifference. Consider the districting problem Π′ given by
Fig. 4 in which X ′ consists of 27 voters, A′ equals the set of all subsets of X ′, µ′ is the
counting measure, and G′ admit the districts shown in Fig. 4, where party A supporters
are indicated by empty circles and party B supporters by solid circles. Observe that
any two consecutive districtings in the sequence D1, . . . , D4 only differ in two districts,
and therefore, Π′ has a linked geography. We shall denote by F the solution given by
FΠ =

{D4} if Π = Π′,
OAΠ if Π
′ is not a subproblem of Π and
{D4} ∪OAΠ|X\X′ if Π
′ is a subproblem of Π,
where the voters of problem Π are located within X and we say that Π′ is a subproblem
of Π if Π′ = Π|X′ and X ′ can be partitioned into three equally sized districts by picking
three districts from the geography of problem Π. It can be verified that F satisfies two-
district determinacy, two-district uniformity and consistency. Clearly, F 6= OA because
of δA(D1) = 3 > δA(D4) = 2 and indifference is violated since otherwise D4 ∈ FΠ
should imply D2 ∈ FΠ.
Finally, to verify that two-district uniformity cannot be dropped from the list of
conditions in Theorem 1 we are again considering problem Π′ from Fig. 4 and are
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Figure 4: Indifference is necessary.
modifying solution F slightly. We shall denote the two-district subproblem of Π′ on
X1 = X
′ \ {d3}, which consists in choosing either districting {d1, d2} or {d4, d5}, by
Π1. Define F̂ as follows,
F̂Π =

{D2, D4} if Π = Π′,
OAΠ if Π
′ and Π1 are not a subproblems of Π
{D2, D4} ∪OAΠ|X\X′ if Π
′ is a subproblem of Π,
{{d4, d5}} ∪OAΠ|X\X1 if Π
′ is not a subproblem of Π but
Π1 is a subproblem of Π.
It can be checked that F̂ satisfies two-district determinacy, indifference and consistency,
but violates two-district uniformity.
Remark 1. Two-district determinacy is strictly weaker than overall determinacy7 even
in the presence of two-district uniformity and consistency.
This can verified by considering the problem Π′ defined in Fig. 4 and a slight
modification of the construction of solution F described two paragraphs earlier. Denote
by F˜ the solution given by
F˜Π =

{D1, D4} if Π = Π′,
OAΠ if Π
′ is not a subproblem of Π and
{D1, D4} ∪OAΠ|X\X′ if Π
′ is a subproblem of Π,
where the voters of problem Π are located within X. It is easily seen that F˜ satisfies
two-district uniformity, consistency and two-district determinacy, but violates overall
determinacy.
We obtain the following result as a simple corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. There does not exist a two-district determinate, two-district uniform,
indifferent, consistent and anonymous solution on linked geographies.
Appendix: Regular Districting Problems
We have already seen examples of linked geographies in Figures 1, 3 and 4. In this ap-
pendix we provide a natural and large class of further examples of districting problems
with linked geographies.
7For a definition of overall determinacy see Footnote 3.
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A bounded subset A of R2 will be called strictly connected if its boundary ∂A is
a Jordan curve (i.e. a non self-intersecting continuous loop). A subset A of a strictly
connected setB ⊆ R2 separates B ifB\A is not strictly connected. We call a continuous
function f : X → R nowhere constant if for any x ∈ X and any neighborhood N(x) of
x there exists a y ∈ N(x) such that f(x) 6= f(y).
Definition 10 (Regular Districting Problems). A districting problem
Π = (X,A, µ, µA, µB , t, G) is called regular if
1. X is a bounded and strictly connected subset of R2,
2. A equals the set of Borel sets on X, i.e. following standard notation A = B(X),
3. µ is a finite and absolutely continuous measure on (X,B(X)) with respect to the
Lebesgue measure,
4. G consists of all bounded, strictly connected and µ(X)/t sized subsets lying in
B(X) and satisfying (1),
5. there exists a continuous nowhere constant function f : X → R such that
µA(C) =
∫
C
f(ω)dµ(ω) for all C ∈ B(X), and
6. µB is given by µB(C) = µ(C)− µA(C) for all C ∈ B(X).
The fifth condition is a technical assumption to ensure that the districtings emerg-
ing in the proof of Lemma 3 below can be selected in a way that they satisfy (1).
Specifically, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If we have two neighboring,8 bounded, strictly connected and µ(X)/t sized
sets d, e ∈ B(X) such that µA(d) = µ(d)/2 (i.e d violates (1)), then we can exchange
territories between d and e in a way that the two resulting bounded, strictly connected
and µ(X)/t sized sets d′, e′ ∈ B(X) satisfy (1).
Proof. Pick a point x ∈ ∂d∩∂e from the relative interior of the common boundary of d
and e. Since f is nowhere constant there exists a y arbitrarily close to x in the interior
of d such that f(y) 6= f(x). Assume that f(y) > f(x). There exist a neighborhood
Nεy (y) of y and a neighborhood Nεx(x) of x such that
∀z ∈ Nεy (y) : f(z) > f(x) +
2
3
(f(y)− f(x)) and
∀z ∈ Nεx(x) : f(z) < f(x) +
1
3
(f(y)− f(x))
by continuity of f .
By establishing a sufficiently thin connection between Nεy (y) and Nεx(x), which
shall be assigned to e′, and exchanging a subset of Nεy (y) with a subset of Nεx(x)∩e in
a way such that µ(d) = µ(d′) = µ(e) = µ(e′), we can guarantee that µA(d′) 6= µ(d′)/2.9
Finally, the case of f(y) < f(x) can be handled in an analogous way.
8We call two subsets of the plane neighboring if they share a common boundary of positive length.
9If µA(e) 6= µ(e)/2, then µA(e′) 6= µ(e′)/2 can be guaranteed by exchanging sets of sufficiently
small measure µ between d and e. In addition, if µA(e) = µ(e)/2 and µA(e
′) = µ(e′)/2, then we can
repeat the exchange of territories between e′ and d′ to ensure that both sets satisfy (1).
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In the following, we write D ∼ D′ if D,D′ ∈ DΠ and there exists a sequence
D1, . . . , Dk of districtings such that D = D1, {D2, . . . , Dk−1} ⊆ DΠ, D′ = Dk and
#Di ∩Di+1 = t− 2 for all i = 1, . . . , k− 1. It is easily verified that ∼ is an equivalence
relation on the set of districtings.
Lemma 3. The geographies of regular districting problems are linked.
Proof. Linkedness is clearly satisfied if t = 1 or t = 2. We show that the linkedness of
the geographies of all regular districting problems for t ≤ n implies the linkedness of
the geographies of all regular districting problems for t = n+ 1. From this, Lemma 3
follows by induction.
Take two arbitrary districtings D and E of a districting problem with t = n+1. We
can pick a district d ∈ D such that d and X have a non-degenerate curve as a common
boundary, i.e. there exists a curve C of positive length such that C ⊆ ∂d ∩ ∂X. We
divide our proof into three steps.
Step 1: We show that there exists a districting D′ ∼ D that contains a district
d′ which shares a common boundary of positive length with the boundary of X and
which does not separate X.
If d itself does not separate X we are done. Thus, assume that d separates X.
For simplicity, we start with the case in which d separates X into only two regions as
shown in the picture on the left of Fig. 5.10 By exchanging territories between the two
Figure 5: d separates X into two regions.
districts d and e, where e is a neighboring district of d, as shown in the picture on the
left of Fig. 5, we can arrive at districts d′ and e′ such that d′ does not separate X.11
More generally, assume that d separates X, where the number of strictly discon-
nected regions of X \ {d} equals k ≤ n. We can find a district e ∈ D and a unique
boundary element x ∈ ∂e such that x ∈ ∂d∩∂X and such that ∂d and ∂e have a common
curve of positive length starting from x. Hence, one can exchange territories between d
and e so that for the resulting new districts d′ and e′ we have that d′ separates X into
at most k − 1 strictly disconnected regions. Clearly, D′ = (D \ {d, e}) ∪ {d′, e′} ∼ D.
Repeating the described bilateral territorial exchange k − 1 times, we thus arrive at a
districting D′ that contains a district d′ which shares a common boundary with X and
which does not separate X.
10Both pictures only show the two districts involved in a territorial exchange and not the entire
districtings.
11It might happen that d′ or e′ violate (1) since we only took care of the shapes and sizes of the
two districts. However, Lemma 2 ensures that through an appropriate territorial exchange between
d′ and e′ we can also ensure (1). In what follows we will carry out all territorial exchanges between
districts so as to satisfy (1) without explicitly mentioning Lemma 2 each time.
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By Step 1, we may thus assume that d ∈ D shares a boundary of positive length
with X and does not separate X.
Step 2: We establish that there exists a districting E′ ∼ E containing a district
e ∈ E′ such that e, d and X have a nondegenerate common boundary, µ(d ∩ e) > 0
and d ∪ e does not separate X.
Clearly, there exist a district e ∈ E possessing a common boundary with d and X,
and satisfying µ(d ∩ e) > 0.
Assume that e separates X, where the number of strictly disconnected regions
of X \ {e} equals k ≤ n (see Fig. 6 to the left for a situation with k = 3). Then
dc ∩ ∂e ∩ ∂X 6= ∅. We can find a district e′ ∈ E with a unique boundary element
x ∈ ∂e′ satisfying x ∈ dc ∩ ∂e ∩ ∂X and that ∂e ∩ ∂e′ has a common curve of positive
length starting from x (as illustrated in the left hand side of Fig. 6). Hence, one can
exchange territories between e and e′ so that for the resulting new districts h and h′
we have that d ∩ e ⊂ h, h separates X into at most k − 1 strictly disconnected regions
(see the right hand side of Fig. 6). Clearly, E′ = (E \ {e, e′})∪{h, h′} ∼ E and we can
Figure 6: Reducing the number of disconnected regions in E.
repeat the procedure to reduce the number of strictly disconnected regions by replacing
E and e with E′ and h, respectively, until we arrive at a districting E′ ∼ E containing
a district e′ that does not separate X and has a common boundary with d. Without
loss of generality, we can thus replace e′ and E′ by e and E, respectively.
We still have to ensure that d ∪ e does not separate X. A situation in which d ∪ e
separates X is shown in the picture on the left hand side of Fig. 7. In addition, the same
Figure 7: Intertwined districts.
picture contains (by the absolute continuity of µ) a possible neighboring district e′ to
e, which is drawn in a way such that e∪ e′ does not separate X, it covers an area from
the separated regions and also an area within d ∪ e. A possible exchange of territories
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which reduces the separated area by d∪ e is illustrated in Fig. 7, where d∪h separates
a smaller area than d ∪ e.12 Pick an arbitrary districting H of X \ (e ∪ e′) into n − 1
strictly connected districts and let E′ = H ∪ {h, h′}. Observe that E \ {e} ∼ H ∪ {e′}
by the induction hypothesis, h ∪ h′ = e ∪ e′ by construction, and therefore E ∼ E′.
Replace e and E with h and E′, respectively. After repeating the described territorial
exchange finitely many times13 one arrives at a district e and a districting E such that
d ∪ e does not separate X and e still satisfies the other desired properties.
Step 3: Since d∪e does not separate X and µ is absolutely continuous, there exists
a strictly connected set h such that µ(h) = 2µ(X)/(n+1), d∪e ⊂ h, d′ = h\d ∈ G and
e′ = h\e ∈ G and h does not separate X (see Fig. 8). Let H be a districting of Y = X\h
Figure 8: Final step.
into n−1 strictly connected districts. Then Π |Y ∪d′ and Π |Y ∪e′ are regular districting
problems, and therefore it follows by the induction hypothesis that D ∼ H ∪ {d, d′}
and H ∪ {e, e′} ∼ E. Clearly, {d, d′} ∼ {e, e′}, which gives H ∪ {d, d′} ∼ H ∪ {e, e′}.
Finally, the statement of Lemma 3 follows from the transitivity of ∼.
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